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John Morrissey is a political geographer at NUI Galway. He has been studying how modern warfare
is changing, looking, in particular, at the novelties introduced by CENTCOM, one of six regional
coordinated command regions of the US military. After the Second World War, the US decided that
in its major theatres of war, its military should be under consolidated command, as provided for the
US military as a whole by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These regional combined commands were given
specific AORs, Areas of Responsibility, and were set up in the Pacific, in the Caribbean/South
America, in the Far East, and in Europe. No more were established until CENTCOM in 1983, which
was first given the Middle East and later extended to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
Morrissey gives two reasons for the creation of CENTCOM. The first was the desire to project US
power and restore its international swagger in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat in Vietnam.
The second was a wish to prevent the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf from inflicting
unwanted shocks upon the US polity and economy. The oil price hike of 1973-74, the so-called
OPEC oil crisis, had quadrupled the price of petrol in the United States and had produced drought at
the pumps. The Iranian revolution of 1979 had resulted in 52 US diplomatic staff being held hostage
by radical students from November 4th, 1979 to January 20th, 1981.
Together, these crises gave further weight to pleas for a more interventionist US posture in the
region. Many of the countries in the region were ex-colonies and they were not at first keen to
receive permanent US bases. Working inwards from ships on the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean to port facilities and bases on islands such as Diego Garcia (shamefully depopulated and then
ceded to the United States by the United Kingdom), and then taking advantage of every regional
conflict to get temporary and then more permanent facilities on land, the United States had basing
agreements with six countries in the CENTCOM region by 1994 and a total of 128 bases in the
region by 2006. Morrissey tracks this expansion of power in commendable detail and there are two
elements highlighted by his analysis that are particularly striking: the first is the way that insecurity
and thus intervention is presented as a permanent condition, and the second is the role of the law in
justifying these interventions.
As Morrissey shows, CENTCOM presented its region as always and forever unstable. In doing this,
its ideologues ignored the continual engagement of the US in the region and instead portrayed it as
an external place from which the United States was repeatedly threatened and to which it was
periodically required to return. Secondly, it treated any possible harm to its own economy or polity
as weighing more heavily in the balance than any manner of injuries it might itself inflict in its
permanent campaign to pacify the Middle East, or Afghanistan, or Pakistan, its AOR.
If we return to those shocks from the 1970s, we find that, in fact, the US was at least partly to
blame. With the Bretton Woods agreement after the Second World War it was guaranteed that the
dollar would always be convertible to gold at a fixed rate. Thus the dollar served as a universal
currency. This meant that all countries had to hold dollars in order to buy imports. This stock of
dollars would have been balanced by the sale of goods to the United States and as long as the
dollars circulated in the global economy or were held as stocks by other countries, the US had been
placed under no obligation to return goods of its own for its imports – it simply printed money.
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When, in August 1971, the United States reneged on this agreement and allowed the dollar to float
competitively against all other currencies, its value fell, and thus oil exporters were getting much
less when they sold their oil for dollars. Against this background the OPEC countries revalued oil in
1973.
However, there was also a proximate cause of the revaluation, and that was US support for Israel in
the Arab-Israeli war that began in October 1973. The war began with an attack upon Israel from
Egypt and Syria on October 6th. On October 12th, the US announced military aid for Israel, and on
October 16th, OPEC raised oil prices by 70 per cent and also cut production.
The Iranian hostage crisis likewise had deep links with US foreign policy dating back to the
mid-1950s, when a democratically elected government in Iran decided to raise money for economic
development by nationalising oil reserves. This was unacceptable to the British and US oil
companies in the region and in 1953 the CIA and MI6 collaborated to topple Mohammad
Mosaddegh and installed a shah answerable to the interests of British and American oil. This was
the autocratic regime that was ultimately overthrown in 1979.
Morrissey argues that forgetting the past is matched by ignoring the present. Insisting on the
likelihood of future crises in the region, CENTCOM avoids having to show that it has met any
realistic expectations about what it might have delivered already. Thus more than thirty years after it
was founded, it still proclaims its mission as stabilising a turbulent region. From its successive
mission statements, Morrissey shows that it repeatedly promises brief and decisive action to snuff
out trouble, without any long-term obligations to reconstruction, yet each of its past actions suggests
interventions will be drawn-out and inconclusive. Focusing upon a continual state of crisis points to
a future with a succession of military interventions across the region, and it is in this sense that,
from 2003, CENTCOM, in its Long War Briefs, accepted that it must retain a permanent state of
war-readiness. In general, the military feels it can only be battle-ready if it is also repeatedly battle-
hardened. The projection of power, then, feeds upon these anxieties about an uncertain future.
The projection of power by CENTCOM is also served by the creative work of legal minds and
Morrissey makes this “lawfare” a central feature of his analysis. He identifies two related strands in
this work. The first is a downgrading of the rights of non-US non-combatants and the second is a
downgrading of the culpability of US combatants. The US has negotiated bilateral agreements
(Status of Forces Agreements - SOFAs) with several countries so that its troops will not be subject
to local justice. This allows the troops to move through and act within foreign spaces as if foreign
sovereignty could lay no finger upon them. Under most of these SOFAs US personnel are subject
only to US law as interpreted by the US military itself.
At the other end of the gun, the targets of US power find themselves framed by new interpretations
of non-combatants. Morrissey quotes former deputy judge advocate general Charles Dunlap, who
argued that Geneva Convention protections for non-combatants are unworkable because civilian
deaths are inevitable in war given that terrorists will hide themselves among them. The convention,
then, limits the effectiveness of military action and is thus, for Dunlap, a hostile agent. Here is how
Dunlap ended his newspaper article on “lawfare and warfare” (Washington Times, August 3rd,
2007):
Though excessive civilian losses must always be avoided, it may very well be a more humane
approach to kill bad guys when the opportunity presents itself even though some civilian
losses may also occur.
Establishing a paradigm of “zero tolerance” for casualties may well come back to haunt us in
yet another way. Specifically, it encourages the enemy to do exactly what we do not want
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them to do: surround themselves with innocent civilians so as to virtually immunize
themselves from attack. It creates a sanctuary that the bad guys are not entitled to enjoy, and
sends them exactly the wrong message.
International law is the friend of civilized societies and the military forces they field.
However, if we impose restraints as a matter of policy in a misguided attempt to “improve”
upon it, we play into the hands of those who would use it to wage lawfare against us.
There is no suggestion that anyone wants to “improve” international law. The question is whether
the US will follow that law at all, and the answer is that it will not. But that does not mean that the
US wants to operate in a legal vacuum. No, as Morrissey describes in chilling detail, the US military
is ensconced within its own versions of the law. By having rules of engagement for its forces, the
military claims the legitimation of following rules, even following law, albeit rules and laws of its
own devising and revision. Law becomes a way to enable killing rather than to protect life.
With lawfare, instead of protecting civilians, law serves instead only to judge cases of excessive or
egregious violence by the military. The data on civilian deaths and the process of judging that
evidence are neither conducted in public, with even the best reported of cases yielding little more
than the release of heavily redacted findings. For CENTCOM operations such as those in Iraq we
rely upon leaks and investigative journalism. As Morrissey also notes, in all this legitimation of
violence through legal innovation, the state of Israel was something of a pioneer.
Israel is not part of CENTCOM’s AOR and is allocated to EUROCOM. The geography of
CENTCOM is a function of geopolitics and of geoeconomics. Due to the general hostility of the
region towards the United States, the headquarters of CENTCOM was placed far way in Florida
whereas EUROCOM was directed locally from Stuttgart in Germany. The configuration of the
region is best explained by its geoeconomic and geopolitical rationale. In geoeconomic terms, the
mission of CENTCOM was to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and to prevent
unwelcome price hikes or interruptions to production. In geopolitical terms, CENTCOM was to
counter Soviet influence in the region. So, at its inception in 1983, the region included all the
countries bordering the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea and then was extended to the immediate
neighbours to the east up to the limits of the Soviet and Indian borders. In 2007, apart from Egypt,
CENTCOM lost the countries south and west of the Red Sea to a new combined command,
AFRICOM. However, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, CENTCOM grew into the oil-rich
Central Asian republics, also again taking its sphere up to the Russian border.
The Long War describes how CENTCOM took shape around the world’s oil spigot. In preserving
this control, it gives little heed to the local inhabitants whose fate, as Morrissey writes, “is to
repeatedly pick up the pieces of unremitting military violence. Families, homes lives: shattered and
lost”. Morrissey recognises a series of ways that the distinction between war and non-war has been
blurred. In the first place, the complementarity of lethal and non-lethal actions means that their
conjoint use will be a continuing feature of military intervention. In the inelegant language of the
2008 version of the US Field Manual 3.0: Operations, quoted in The Long War, the military now
accepts “the essentiality of nonlethal actions with combat actions”. Morrissey concludes his
discussion of lawfare by noting that this “reflects, ultimately, a blurring of what counts as war”. He
also remarks that, with their 2006 statement of the US military posture, the Joint Chiefs had
“dropped the legal distinction between ‘War’ and ‘Military Operations Other Than War’”.
This is an important observation. The irrelevance of a declaration of war underlines still further the
US loss of respect for the sovereignty of other states. Its claim to a permanent right of military
intervention is an assertion that in all places and at all times “military operations other than war”
can take lethal form. Here one of the truly distinctive features of CENTCOM has been its reliance
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upon drone warfare; in that respect it further claims the right to kill, to kill civilians, to do so
without warning, and to do so outside a zone recognised as at risk by declaration of war. The drone
is a very significant extension of the separation of killing from the rules of war and CENTCOM has
pioneered this.
Geopolitics and geoeconomics: the defence industries and the oil industries. These have dominated
US interventions in the so-called Middle East and CENTCOM oversees both, priming military
spending both in the United States and as exports to its “allies”, but also by making oil exporters
dependent upon the “protection” of the US military. This has cost the US taxpayer a large fortune
but it has made fortunes for the vested interests attached to CENTCOM. We inherit a world made
by CENTCOM, which involves conflict without end. Or as Morrissey concludes this important
book: “Imperialism has always been about shaping, and there is no endgame.”
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